The linguistic strategies in Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches as a tool of Hezbollah’s public diplomacy
Natalie Smrekar, Institut français du proche-orient
Abstract
This article explores the linguistic strategies employed in the speeches of Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah. We want to examine the role of these speeches in shaping perceptions and influencing both local and international audiences. In an evolving media landscape, this analysis contributes to an understanding of how linguistic elements intersect with broader trends in public diplomacy in the Middle East. We will focus on the concepts of message dissemination (used by Khayyat), international broadcasting and advocacy. Our study will use a qualitative approach to the corpus, relying on videos and texts. The corpus is composed of three speeches delivered in 2004, 2019 and 2020.
Key words : Linguistic strategies; Hassan Nasrallah; Public diplomacy; Message dissemination; International broadcasting
Introduction
Language serves as a potent tool of influence and power. Through effective communication, individuals can sway opinions and shape realities – a fundamental principle in pragmatics. If pragmatics in everyday language implies practicality, its linguistic exploration engages in how context shapes language interpretation. Pragmatics studies the shades of communication, examining implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and contextual meaning.
The main idea could be summarized by quoting one of the founders of modern pragmatics, John Austin: “speaking does not only mean acting in the world, but also acting upon the world”.[1]
This concept is closely related to the functions theorized by Jakobson.[2] He identifies six elements in communication[3] and considers that each one of them is dominant among six communicative functions.[4] These functions shape interactions highlighting the dynamic nature of communication.
For instance, the conative function hints the receiver’s response to the act of communication and encourages participation. The emotive one – a present function in Hassan Nasrallah’s speech as well – communicates the sender’s emotions, attitudes, and status. Jakobson’s theory is used in many fields such as marketing, advertising, or politics. In politics, mastering these concepts is fundamental to achieve success as a leader and to gain support.
This article aims to analyze the tools that Hezbollah uses in public diplomacy. The hypothesis is that Hassan Nasrallah’s speech is a potent tool of public diplomacy for the party, particularly when the discourse addresses foreign audiences. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how these speeches are crafted in order to maximizes their conative impact on the public.
The concept of public diplomacy, introduced by Cull[5], differs from the traditional diplomacy, which in general involves mainly nations and international organizations. Now, the new public diplomacy now extends its reach to encompass a broad spectrum of participants, including NGOs, political parties, activists, and other forms of organized entities. Contemporary diplomatic practices have a dynamic nature where influence and persuasion operate through diverse channels and stakeholders.
Cull’s works on the concept of Public Diplomacy (PD) has provided a taxonomy encompassing various dimensions. They are listed as follows:
1) Listening (the foundation for all effective public diplomacy);
2) Advocacy;
3) Cultural Diplomacy;
4) Exchange;
5) International Broadcasting;
6) Psychological Warfare[6]
Through reinforcing cultural initiatives and effectively disseminating information key messages, countries and organizations can shape their image on a global stage and promote their interests.
As an example of message dissemination, the United States has sought to export and propagate American ideals and values across the globe. This concerted effort manifests through different ways, such as music, cinema, fashion, and emerging cultural trends; all serving as potent vehicles for the dissemination of American influence.
In his thesis, Khayyat[7] focuses on recursivity, which refers to how political communication and media systems interact with each other in feedback and feed-forward loops, intensifying the political message. Recursivity is a form of dissemination in communication, which involves the repetition of an idea across various communication channels. In his study, Khayyat examines the conflicting media representations, intertexts, and the ideologically determined reporting of Hezbollah’s activities.
In what follows, we will delve into an in-depth analysis of the rhetorical strategies employed by Hassan Nasrallah.
Context and history of Hezbollah and the raise of Hassan Nasrallah
The Hezbollah, founded in 1982, is an Iranian backed Lebanese Party. Hassan Nasrallah[8] is his leader since 1992. He has a crucial political significance for the Shia community, historically marginalized in Lebanon. Norton[9] emphasized that Shiite empowerment was crucial for real change in Lebanon in the 20th century. Hassan Nasrallah gained prominence after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 and 2006 war. His charisma transcends communities, and his interventions are followed not only by his supporters, but also by his enemies. This is confirmed by Blanford, in fact, after the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, his popularity was such that he ranked among the most popular leaders in the Arab world in a survey conducted in Egypt.[10]
Background on Nasrallah’s Speeches
More then a political chief, Hassan Nasrallah is also a military chief and religious figure[11]. As Charaudeau[12] affirms: “The political actor must navigate between two types of discourse: one with a strong symbolic content and one of pragmatic firmness. The politician’s discourse must carry values so that the people can see themselves reflected in the mirror of an ideal of living well together.”
This statement fits perfectly with Hassan Nasrallah, who has the ability to deliver a discourse that is both pragmatic and rich in symbolism, especially when he refers to religious sphere. For instance, the use of the term ḏull (humiliation), recalling the constant humiliation to which the Shiite community was subjected to, is employed on purpose to refer to present political affairs.
Another example is mentioned by Mervin.[13] She notes Hezbollah’s use of Karbala[14] symbolism, in order to promote moral victories of the oppressed over the oppressor, akin to Husayn’s martyrdom. In 2006, Nasrallah’s declaration: “You will not erase our memory” is an echo of Husayn’s sister, Zaynab, after her brother’s death while she was taken captive by the Caliph Yazid. As a matter of fact, Hezbollah claimed a “divine victory” after 2006, reflecting its ideological narrative.
Analyzing Nasrallah’s language reveals the intricate interplay of words, symbols, and historical context in shaping Shiite identity and political influence. His speeches focus on words whose meaning transcends State borders and create a cohesion for the Shiite community.
A proficient speaker of standard Arabic (fuṣḥā) and Lebanese dialectal varieties (dārija), Nasrallah is widely known as a great orator who also knows how to use the specificities of the plurilingual context inherent to Arabic-speaking societies, the so-called “continuum”.[15]
As the General Secretary of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah assumes a prominent role on the public stage, primarily through his oratory – evident in his speeches – which are delivered via broadcasting. As affirmed by Matar,[16] due to security concerns,[17] Nasrallah’s physical appearances on stage are very rare. He delivers his sermons from a remote location. Despite these constraints, he is very often present on the media scene, being the only Lebanese politician who makes regular speeches.
All Hezbollah system works to make the speech an event in itself. Typically, Nasrallah’s speeches are announced early by all main Lebanese channels and newspapers, like Al-Akhbār and Al-Manar. In addition, designated public spaces are often arranged to enable supporters to collectively witness the speech, with projections onto sizable screens.
The influence of Nasrallah’s speeches extends significantly to the public opinion. Nasrallah demonstrates a keen understanding of the potent role played by the media in shaping public perceptions. His speeches are extensively broadcast, thereby reaching a broad and diverse audience. The accessibility of these messages contributes substantively to their impact.
The Linguistic Analysis Framework and the corpus
In this article, we aim to proceed with a linguistic analysis focusing on rhetorical features and language registers employed in Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches. We intend to use the term “register” as it is defined by Halliday: “It refers to specific lexical and grammatical choices as made by speakers depending on the situational context, the participants of a conversation and the function of the language in the discourse”.[18] Within Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this concept proves instrumental in explaining how language constructs and conveys social meanings, ideologies, and power relations. Adhering to this school of thoughts, Wodak and Meyers highlight:
“Roots of CDA lie in rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, sociopsychology, cognitive science, literary studies, sociolinguistics, applied linguistics, and pragmatics, emphasizing the interdisciplinary nature of these studies.”[19]
Our methodological approach aligns with van Leeuwen’s[20], who is another researcher from the Critical Discourse Analysis school of thoughts. In particular, he theorized the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)[21] method. Defining discourses as socially constructed ways of knowing reality, DHA uses triangulation procedures for research validity. This multilevel analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches.
The corpus under examination consists of three speeches. The first, dated of the 25th of October 2019, was delivered a week after the start of the Lebanese ṯawra.[22] (revolution). The second speech was given on the 10th of April 10, 2004, during the opening of the festival organized in support of the Iraqi people during the US occupation. Finally, the third speech was delivered on the 5th of January 2020. Its main theme revolves around the assassination of General Qāsem Suleīmāni, which took place at Baghdad airport by an American drone.
The language in Hassan Nasrallah’s discourse
There are two main characteristics of Hassan Nasrallah’s language. Both characteristics contribute to the element that Khayyat calls “message”. The first is code-switching, the second is the use of stylistic and rhetorical features.
As for the code-switching, the leader of the party demonstrates a unique proficiency in both standard Arabic and dialect, transitioning between both registers during his speeches. This exceptional ability sets him apart within the Lebanese political scene, where most politicians use the Lebanese dialect. In fact, in situations requiring standard Arabic, many Lebanese politicians read from prepared texts or encounter difficulties in expression. Instead, Hassan Nasrallah has a knowledge of standard Arabic that comes from years of rigorous training during his Koranic studies.[23]
Using his ability in switching between the different registers of the Arabic continuum, he can modify the delivery of the speech, allowing for a more direct expression of the message and a better conveyance of its meaning.
A wide literature exists on the phenomenon of code-switching in Arabic political discourse. For instance, Holes published a study on Gamal Abd al-Nasir.[24] Another influential contribution to this domain is Bassiouney’s 2006 study,[25] in which he conducted both structural and pragmatic analyses of nine monologues, including political speeches characterized by Mixed Arabic.[26]
These studies aim to understand the functionality of this change in the register within the same speech. Mazraani’s work[27] explored the variation in Arab political discourse by analyzing speeches by prominent figures like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar al-Qaddafi. She observed that fuṣḥā Arabic is often used when discussing general and abstract concepts, while dialect is employed for personal subjects. Furthermore, speakers often retain phonological, morphological, and syntactic elements of the dialectal variety when modifying their register to a more formal language, while when shifting to a lower register, it is often the lexicon of fuṣḥā Arabic that is retained.
Germanos’ work in 2018[28] offers valuable insights on Nasrallah’s selective use of registers. She takes into consideration one speech of the 8th of April of 2007.
In order to understand the strategical use of code-switching, we can take the case of the discourse delivered on the 25th of October 2019. In this speech, Hassan Nasrallah expresses himself on the events that are shaking the capital of Lebanon and the ṯawra. He employs the Lebanese dialect for most of the speech, mainly because he is addressing an internal audience. However, we can observe some code-switching episodes in this speech. The incipit, which consists in an invocation to the grace of Allah, is a formula which is common to most of the official speeches in the Arab world and it is delivered in fuṣḥā. This is his way of beginning the allocution, with a sentence that sounds familiar to his audience, while, at the same time, it serves as an invocation to God and to the religious sphere. We can analyze some extracts of this speech:[29]
أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم، بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، والحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا ونبينا خاتم النبيين أبي القاسم محمد بن عبد الله وعلى آله الطيبين الطاهرين وصحبه المنتجبين، وعلى جميع الأنبياء والمرسلين.
[extract 1]
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, the Lord of all the worlds, and blessings and peace be upon our master and prophet, the seal of the prophets, Abi all-Qāsim Muhammad ibn Abdullah, and upon his pure and immaculate family, and chosen companions, and upon all the prophets and messengers. (translations provided by the author)
The invocation to God and the prophet is evident.
He then continues in Arabic:
لن أتوقف عند السلبيات والمخارج والحدود، وأيضاً تشخيص طبيعة ما يجري والإلفات إلى بعض المخاطر، واختم بالموقف الواضح والمباشر والذي أريد أن أتوجه به إلى الناس، وأيضاً إلى جمهور المقاومة بشكل خاص ومحدد.
[extract 2]
I will not stop at the negatives, the obstacles, and the boundaries, as well as diagnosing the nature of what is happening and pointing out some risks. I conclude with a clear, direct stance that I want to address to the people, especially the resistance audience, specifically and clearly.
Then, he switches to Lebanese Arabic, to focus on the events that are going on in the current week of protests. From the minute 01:50[30], we can notice that is present code-switching from Standard Arabic to Lebanese dialect.
Yōm al- sabt, baʿd yawmēn tlēte min badʾ -ḥirāk al-šaʿbi, anā ḥa sammī bil-iṣṭilāḥ al-ḥirāk al-šaʿbi, anā qult ʾenno haḏa ḥirāk šaʿbi, ‘afawī, ṣādiʿ, ʿābir lil-ṭawā’if, lil-munāṭiq, yaʿbir ʿan ālām alnās waḫawjā ʿalnās waḥumūm alnās wa laysa ḫādiʿan li ayyi ḥizb walāyi safāra. W īmkin anā ‘aktar waḥad fiyye ʾul ʾennō iḥtaramet al-ḥarāk w alnās illī nezlū bilḥirāk, qult li elhum naḥnu nuḥtarimkon, naʾaddirkum, ‘aktar min natfahmkun, wa natabar ʾan ma faʿaltum ktir muhim, ʿaẓīm wa natā’iǧuh mumtezi, wa kamēn waḍḍaḥet enno ḥizballāh ma bīʾedir išērikhum bihaḏā al-ḥirāk, li’annahu ‘iḏa šērak ḥizballāh ḥa ibaayyin lawn bi šakl wadiḥ sayeḫoḍ al ḥirāk
[extract 3]
Then, we notice another shift to the Lebanese dialect:
مسارا آخر.سيصبح له بعداُ سياسياً ويتهم بالموضوع الإقليمي والصراعات الإقليمية وما شاكل.
مصلحة الحراك ان يبقى بعيدا عنا وعن الأحزاب، وأيضاً قلت
[extract 4]
:And another shift to Lebanese Arabic
ʾEnno entō fikōn tenzalō ʿa šēriaʿ laʾanno entō jiha ġer muḥaddade, jiha šabiyye mutanawiʿa, btʾedro tebʾō liom aw tnen aw tlete aw jemaʿ [extract 5]
.
On Saturday, after three days of the start of the popular movement—I’ll refer to it as the popular movement for terminology’s sake—I stated that this is a movement we respect. It is spontaneous, sincere, transcends sects and regions, expresses people’s pains, sorrows, and concerns, and is not subject to any party or embassy. Perhaps I’m the person who can most say that I respected the movement and the people who participated in it. I told them, « We respect you, appreciate you, more than just understand you, and consider what you’ve done very important, great, and its results excellent. » I also clarified that Hezbollah cannot participate in this movement because if Hezbollah participates, its color will clearly appear in all areas, and the movement will take a different path. It will acquire a political dimension and be accused of regional issues and regional conflicts and the like. The interest of the movement is to remain distant from us and from parties. I also said that you can take to the streets because you are an unspecified entity, various popular entities, you can stay for a day, two days, and a week.
After a while, we can observe a new switch to standard Arabic:
على كل، وأيضاً تمنيت على المتظاهرين من موقع أخوي من أجل أن ينجح حراككم ان يتجنبوا الشتائم والسباب وأعمال التخريب والأملاك العامة والأملاك الخاصة والصدام مع الجيش والقوى الأمنية، وتمنينا على الجيش والقوى الأمنية أيضا أن يأخذوا الناس بحلمهم ولطفهم
[extract 6]
In any case, I also wished for the protesters, from a brotherly perspective, for your movement to succeed by avoiding insults, cursing, acts of sabotage, damage to public and private property, and clashes with the army and security forces. We also hoped for the army and security forces to treat people with kindness and gentleness.
This example illustrates a deliberate transition between linguistic registers, strategically employed to maximize consensus in the speech. Analyzing the code-switching within this speech, the adherence to Mazraani’s framework is clear.[31] For instance, in extract 2, Standard Arabic is used because of the abstract topics that are discussed.
Another shift, this time to the Lebanese dialect, confirms the adherence to Mazraani’s theory. In fact, in extract 3, Hassan Nasrallah uses dialect when narrating stories or recounting events.
Focusing on the content of this passage, Nasrallah demonstrates empathy towards protesters, calling them “brothers”. He tries to create a certain level of intimacy, while maintaining a diplomatic position, advocating for mutual understanding and compassion between security forces and protesters in their interactions.
Changes in language register could also be noticed depending on the audience. The hypothesis is that he adjusts the register depending on whether the public is local or regional. This could be seen as a new public diplomacy practice since the objective is to establish connections with foreign audiences. Therefore, we can consider the speech delivered on the 18th of May 2004. The speech, delivered by Nasrallah, takes place at an event organized to show solidarity and support to the Iraqi people, marking one year since the US invasion of Iraq.
There is a varied audience, from the Lebanese supporters of Hezbollah to the Iraqi population, listening to the discourse. Therefore, the use of Standard Arabic during all the speech is comprehensible. The outstanding characteristic of this speech is the semantically pregnant lexicon.
The speaker starts his speech greeting and giving some epithets to all the martyrs in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, calling them “martyrs”.
في البداية نتوجه إلى الأرواح الطيبة للشهداء المظلومين والمجاهدين في العراق وفلسطين ولبنان وكل ساحات صراع الحق مع الباطل بالتحية والإعظام والتعظيم والإجلال، ونهدي إلى أرواحهم الطيبة الطاهرة سورة الفاتحة
[extract 7]
In the beginning, we extend our salutations, reverence, respect, and honor to the noble souls of the oppressed martyrs and fighters in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and all arenas where truth confronts falsehood. We dedicate Sūra Al-Fātiḥa to their kind and pure souls.
We can find several rhetorical features within these lines.
First, the importance of the use of the word šahīd (martyr). Moreover, giving the martyrs the adjective maẓlūmīn (oppressed) recalls the multiple situations of oppression that the Shia lived during their history. The most famous of these events in Shia tradition is the assassination of Hussein in Karbala in 680.
If we focus on the formal elements, the repetition of the conjunction وَ (and) serves as an anaphora, which emphasizes the significance of each location mentioned in the sentence.
The hyperbole is another figure we can find in this extract. It is employed by this leader to describe the reverence and honour given to the martyrs and fighters, such as al-taʿẓīm wa al-ʾīǧlāl (admiration and glorification). It can be seen as hyperbolic, intensifying the emotional impact of the tribute.
Overall, these rhetorical figures contribute to the emotive and reverential tone of the passage, effectively honouring the martyrs and fighters mentioned, appealing to common narratives and traditions.
In the same speech:
. قبل عام وعلى امتداد العام الماضي كان لنا موقف واضح وصريح جداً من الاحتلال لأميركي للعراق. لقد رفضنا هذا الاحتلال وأدنّاه، وأيضاً منذ البداية كنا ندرك ونفهم الغايات والأهداف الحقيقية لهذا الاحتلال، للحرب الأميركية على العراق وشرحنا ذلك وأوضحنا ذلك في أكثر من مناسبة واحتفال ولقاء. اليوم وبعد مضي عام واحد فقط على الاحتلال الأميركي للعراق سقطت كل الشعارات الأميركية المزيفة وانكشفت كل الأهداف الأميركية الحقيقية التي تقف خلف الحرب والاحتلال
[extract 8]
A year ago, and throughout the past year, we had a very clear and explicit stance regarding the American occupation of Iraq. We strongly rejected and condemned this occupation. From the beginning, we were aware of and understood the true goals and objectives behind this occupation, behind the American war on Iraq. We explained and clarified this on numerous occasions, celebrations, and meetings. Today, just one year after the American occupation of Iraq, all the false American slogans have collapsed, and all the true American objectives behind the war and occupation have been revealed.
We can notice the contrast between al-šʿārāt al-āmīrakīa al-muzaīafa (the false American slogans) and al-ʾahdāf al- āmīrikīa al- ḥaqīqa (true American objectives), which highlights the speaker’s assertion that the American agenda was deceitful and manipulative. This is an example of anti-imperialist narrative. He claims the false intentions of the US while invading Iraq. Nasrallah frequently criticizes Western hegemony and portrays Hezbollah’s struggle as part of an anti-imperialist resistance movement. By framing Hezbollah’s actions within this narrative, he seeks to gain support from leftist and anti-imperialist groups worldwide, as well as from countries opposed to Western dominance in the Middle East. In this case, he expresses solidarity towards the Iraqi people.
Religious rhetoric is a prevalent element as well, given Nasrallah’s frequent use of Islamic themes and terminology. He uses these to appeal to the devout followers of Hezbollah and to frame the organization’s goals within a religious context. By invoking Islamic principles and references to Koranic verses, he reinforces the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s actions among its supporters.
For example, in the speech delivered on the 5th of January 2020 we can find some quotes of the Quran.
This speech is most of it in Standard Arabic because it evokes the assassination of Qasem Suleimani. Another reason for this choice is that the audience is the whole Arab world.
At the minute 00:37[32], talking about the martyrdom of the Iranian General and the šuhadāʾ(martyrs) in general, Nasrallah quotes the sūra Al-ʿImrān; 169 of the Quran:
» وَلا تَحْسَبَنَّ الَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ أَمْواتًا بَلْ أَحْياءٌ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِمْ يُرْزَقُونَ،
فَرِحِينَ بِما آتاهُمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ وَيَسْتَبْشِرُونَ بِالَّذِينَ لَمْ يَلْحَقُوا بِهِمْ مِنْ خَلْفِهِمْ أَلاَّ خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ،
يَسْتَبْشِرُونَ بِنِعْمَةٍ مِّنَ اللَّهِ وَفَضْلٍ وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ لاَ يُضِيعُ أَجْرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ » صدق الله العلي العظيم.
[extract 9]
Never think of those martyred in the cause of Allah as dead. In fact, they are alive with their Lord, well provided for rejoicing in Allah’s bounties and being delighted for those yet to join them. There will be no fear for them, nor will they grieve. They are joyful for receiving Allah’s grace and bounty, and that Allah does not deny the reward of the believers.
In these examples, we can find many topics that are recurrent, helping with the idea of recursivity. In his speeches, we can notice the repetition of certain concepts which form the foundation of Hezbollah’s ideology.
We frequently find the rhetoric of resistance. As we noticed in the analysis of extract 8, Nasrallah frequently employs the rhetoric of resistance against perceived external threats, particularly Israel and Western imperialism. This discourse resonates deeply with the Lebanese Shia population and with wider Arab and Muslim audiences, who sympathize with the Palestinian cause and perceive Hezbollah as a bulwark against Israeli aggression.
Then, there is also the idea of martyrdom and sacrifice. As we mentioned in the analysis of extract 9, Nasrallah often glorifies the concept of martyrdom and sacrifice, portraying Hezbollah fighters who have died in battle as heroic figures. This rhetoric inspires not only loyalty among Hezbollah members but resonates also with broader Shia Islamic traditions which venerate martyrdom.
We can affirm that Nasrallah’s language choices reflect a sophisticated understanding of his diverse audience’s ideological and cultural sensibilities. By leveraging religious symbolism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, and cultural references, he aims to solidify Hezbollah’s support base, both within Lebanon and among sympathetic audiences abroad.
The party understands well the transformative power of modern media. These technologies offer not only a platform for Nasrallah’s speeches to reach a global audience, but also reshape fundamentally the dynamics of dissemination and reception. Hezbollah’s interest in managing its image and controlling its media narrative is an objective since its birth. During this time, Hezbollah has made a concerted effort to ensure its visibility and defend its ideological project while seeking autonomy in communication channels. Despite disruptions caused by the civil war in the 1980s, Hezbollah has persevered in its media efforts, leading to the establishment of key outlets such as Al-Ahad in 1984 and Al-Nur in 1988.[33] Additionally, in the first years of the 21st century, Al-Manar has emerged as one of the first Arabic satellite channels, further expanding Hezbollah’s media reach and influence. These early initiatives laid the groundwork for Hezbollah’s robust media presence. For instance, the 14th of August 2007 was the first anniversary of the victory after the 33-days war. That day, there was a huge preparation for the delivery of the speech in public places in Baalbeck and Bint Jbeil to follow live Hassan Nasrallah’s speech. The party allowed an interview with Al-Jazeera and a lot of special programs were broadcast on the radio and the television channel of the party.
Today, the proliferation of digital platforms has given Nasrallah an unparalleled reach, allowing his speeches to resonate across borders and cultures instantaneously. Thus, the integration of digital communication technologies into Hezbollah’s media strategy has not only enhanced its global influence, but also presented new challenges and opportunities in information, dissemination, and persuasion.
In this article, we gave some examples of public diplomacy employed by Hezbollah. One of the main ways of achieving this is through Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches. We analyzed examples of the strategic use of language as a tool of public diplomacy, focusing particularly on the alternation between different registers of language and the employment of rhetorical strategies. Another aspect which remains fundamental is the work behind the delivery of the discourse. In a situation of conflicts or discords, as Omini and Mobini affirm:
“A discourse will occupy a better position, or a signifier will be attributed to existing signified because of power relations. That is precisely what Foucault calls the genealogy of discourses. Norman Fairclough uses the concept of the power behind discourses to explain this idea. The ability of discourses to consolidate the meaning and their hegemony depends on the strength which is behind them. The power behind a discourse signifies signs in a particular way by highlighting them. By generating consensus, it makes them hegemonic in the public sphere.”[34]
The speech is also based on the legitimacy of the orator, as Charaudeau asserts.[35] Hezbollah knows it well, for this reason there is a huge work of “cultivation” of Nasrallah’s image, who has become the charismatic figure who allows the party to reach a wider support. He is the leader who provides by default a large positive impact.[36]
In conclusion, we can affirm that code-switching and recalling elements of common tradition and history are powerful tools to capture public attention and deliver the message in a more direct way. This practice fosters a deeper level of intimacy with the local and foreign audience. This is one of the main characteristics of the new public diplomacy.[37]
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[1] Austin, J. L. (2023). How to Do Things with Words. Important Books.
[2] Bradford, R. (2005). Roman Jakobson: Life, Language and Art. Taylor & Francis. p. 56.
[3] The addresser, the context, the message, the contact, the code, and the addressee
[4] He defines the emotive function, the conative function, the referential function, the poetic function, the phatic and the metalinguistic function.
[5] Cull, N. J. (2009). Public diplomacy: Lessons from the past. Figueroa Press.
[6] Cull, N. J. (2009). Op. Cit. p. 10.
[7] Khayyat, T. (2014). Political Communication in the Age of Dissemination: Media Constructions of Hezbollah, PhD Thesis. University of Bath. p. 11.
[8] Hassan Nasrallah has been its General Secretary since 1992. He was born in 1960 on the outskirts of Beirut, where his family ran a store. During the Lebanese Civil War, his family fled Beirut, and Nasrallah joined Amal’s militia before travelling to Najaf, Iraq, to study the Quran. Little was known about Nasrallah’s oratorical skills and charismatic qualities until later. Forced to escape Iraq in 1978 due to a crackdown by the Baathist regime, Nasrallah returned to Lebanon, rejoining Amal before leaving eventually due to the schism between its secular and Islamist members. He then fought for Amal in the Beqaa region before breaking away in 1982 following Israel’s invasion, joining Hezbollah. In 1989, Nasrallah pursued studies in Qom, Iran, before returning to Lebanon. Since assuming leadership of Hezbollah in 1992, he has played a significant role in Lebanese politics.
[9] Norton, A. R. (1989). Amal and the Shiʿa: struggle for the soul of Lebanon, American Political Science Review, 83, 332–333.
[10] Blanford, N. (2007). Introduction. In N. Noe and N. Blandford (eds.), Voice of Hezbollah: The Statement of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1–13. Verso. P. 1
[11] He is called sayyed. While the title « Sayyed » indicates a lineage traced back to the Prophet Muhammad, it doesn’t necessarily imply formal academic or religious studies. In the case of Hassan Nasrallah, he is known to have received a traditional religious education in Lebanon. He studied at the religious seminaries in Najaf, Iraq, which are centres of Shiite Islamic learning. Nasrallah’s education would have involved studying Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and other religious sciences. Nasrallah’s credibility and authority within the Shiite community do not come only from his lineage, but also from his leadership role in Hezbollah and his knowledge of Islamic teachings and principles, acquired through religious studies and practical experience.
[12] Charaudeau, P. (2015). Le charisme comme condition du leadership politique, Revue française des sciences de l’information et de la communication, 7. p. 7.
[13] Mervin, S. (2017). En attendant l’Imam : autorité religieuse et pouvoir politique dans le chiisme duodécimain. In S. Mervin and N. Mouline (eds.), Islams politiques. Courants, doctrines et idéologies. CNRS Éditions. p. 150.
[14] The battle of Karbala is at the heart of Shiite doctrines. The faithfuls relive it every year by observing commemoration rituals in ad hoc places of worship (husseiniyya), in homes, in public spaces. In 680, Husayn, the third imam for the Shiites, was martyred there with part of his family and his companions as he defended his “right” to the succession of the Prophet against the Caliph Yazid, refusing to pledge allegiance to him. Yazid’s army crushed Husayn’s small group, and he was beheaded. The survivors, including his sister Zaynab and his son Ali, who would ensure the continuity of the lineage, were captured and taken to Damascus to the caliph’s court. This episode of the imams’ saga feeds Shiite beliefs with role models to imitate and moral values. See Mervin, S. (2017). En attendant l’Imam : autorité religieuse et pouvoir politique dans le chiisme duodécimain. In S. Mervin and N. Mouline (eds.), Islams politiques. Courants, doctrines et idéologies. CNRS Éditions.
[15] The linguistic situation of Arabic can be defined as a “linguistic continuum”. According to Berruto in his analysis of the situation of Italian, this is a concept that stands opposed to diglossia. Ferguson’s idea of diglossia in the Arabic language, as proposed by Diab-Duranton, highlights diaphasic variation. However, the binary scheme opposing standard Arabic to the vernacular language is no longer considered valid. Berruto observed that the variation space of the language does not exhibit rigid and separate compartmentalization but is formed by a series of varying elements with no interruption. Language varieties overlap and blend into one another, without establishing rigid boundaries. He asserts that there is multidimensionality as variation axes intersect and combine simultaneously. See Berruto, G. (1997). Linguistica del contatto e aspetti dell’italianizzazione dei dialetti: appunti di creolistica casalinga. In G. Holtus, J. Kramer and W. Schweickard (eds.), La linguistica del contatto in Italia, 13–29. Max Niemeyer Verlag; Diab-Duranton, S. (2015). Substitution et créativité lexicales en arabe : Compilation, théorisation et restructuration. Geuthner.
[16] Matar, D. (2015). Hassan Nasrallah: The Cultivation of Image and Language in the Making of a Charismatic Leader, Communication, Culture and Critique, 8(3), 433–447.
[17] He is a target of many intelligence agencies, including the Israeli Mossad.
[18] Halliday, M. A. K. (1989). Spoken and written language. Oxford University Press. p. 44.
[19] Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009). Critical discourse analyses: History, agenda, theory, and methodology. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 9–31. Sage Publication. p. 11.
[20] Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009). Op. Cit.
[21] DHA’s triangulatory approach is mainly theoretical and based on the concept of context which takes into account four levels: (1) the immediate language-or text-internal co-text; (2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses; (3) the extralinguistic (social) level, which is called the “context of situation” and is explained by middle-range theories; and (4) the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts. Permanent switching between these levels and evaluating the findings from these different perspectives should minimize the risk of being biased. Beyond it, DHA suggests methodical triangulation by using multi methodical designs on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information. See Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009). Op. Cit.
[22] The Thawra refers to the massive popular protests that began in Lebanon in October 2019 to protest endemic corruption, poor economic management, social inequalities, and the perceived inefficacy and disconnect of the political class from the population. The uprising brought together people of different religious denominations and political affiliations, who demanded radical political and economic reform, the resignation of the government, and a new constitution. The protests were characterized by sit-ins, marches, strikes, and roadblocks.
[23] For a more detailed biography of Hassan Nasrallah regarding his educational background, see Daher, A. (2014). Le Hezbollah : Mobilisation et pouvoir. Presses Universitaires de France.
[24] Holes, C. (1993). The Uses of Variation: A Study of the Political Speeches of Gamāl c Abd al-Nāṣir. In M. Eid and C. Holes (eds.), Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics 5, 13–45. John Benjamins.
[25] Bassiouney, R. (2006). Functions of Code Switching in Egypt: Evidence from Monologues. Brill.
[26] Medjell tries to give a definition: “Native Arabic speakers do recognize and have a concept of language use which is neither (high) formal fusḥā nor everyday spoken ʿāmmiya – generally labeled luġa wusṭā (middle/medium language). Apart from its « in-between », « mixed », quality, native speakers express rather vague ideas about the linguistic properties of luġa wusṭā This is also true of most native linguists—although they do recognize its diversity and fluctuating characteristics.” Mejdell, G. (2006). Mixed Styles in Spoken Arabic in Egypt: Somewhere between Order and Chaos. Brill.p.45
[27] Mazraani, N. (2011). Aspects of language variation in Arabic political speech-making. Routledge.
[28] Germanos. (2018). Fonctions de l’alternance entre arabe standard et vernaculaire libanais et connotations des deux codes dans un discours politique d’opposition, Arabica, 65, 501-536.
[29] The extracts written in Arabic character are in fuṣḥā, the transcripted ones are in dārija following the rules of the Revue Arabica.
[30] From the speech of the 25th of October of 2019- Kalima al-ʾamīn al ʿām-yataḥaddaṯ ʿan ʾāḫar al-taṭwirāt https://program.almanar.com.lb/episode/86220
[31] Mazraani, N. (2011). Op. Cit.
[32]From the speech of 5th of January of 2020 Kalima al-ʾamīn al ʿām ʿabr qanat Al-Manār https://program.almanar.com.lb/episode/108033
[33] Lamloum, O. (2008). Le Hezbollah au miroir de ses médias. In S. Mervin (ed.), Le Hezbollah : état des lieux, 21–45. Actes Sud. p. 26.
[34] Omidi, A. and Mobini, Z. (2022). p. 4
[35] Charaudeau, P. (2015). Op. Cit. p. 3.
[36] See Matar, D. (2015). Op. Cit.
[37] Cull asserts that regarding the nature of the role, the transition from targeted messaging to relationship-building represents a key distinction between old and new public diplomacy. See Cull, N. J. (2009). Op. Cit.
Biography :
Natalie Smrekar is currently writing a thesis titled « Lexicon and Linguistic Variation in Shiite Political Discourse: The Example of Hassan Nasrallah » at LIDILEM, laboratory in the Department of Language Sciences at the Université Grenoble Alpes.